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Progress in Federal Regulatory Policy, 
1980-2000 
Murray Weidenbaum 
A sea change has occurred in public 
attitudes toward government regulation in 
the two decades since 1980. Like the state, 
the federal regulatory apparatus has not 
withered away. In some important dimen-
sions, regulation has expanded substan-
tially. Nevertheless, a fundamental shift 
has occurred in the public policy process. 
"Command and control" is no longer a 
phrase used in polite company. Its place 
has been taken by almost obligatory refer-
ences to "the magic of the marketplace." 
The proponents of regulation now feel 
obliged to talk about costs as well as ben-
efits, private as well as public sector alter-
natives, incentives and disincentives, and 
thus to consider the disadvantages as well 
as the advantages of this form of govem-
ment intervention in the larger society. 
Despite significant achievements, the 
regulatory reform effort of the past two 
decades seems to have run its course. A 
new strategy is needed, one that focuses 
greater attention on reducing the short-
comings of the basic regulatory statutes, 
both to eliminate the barriers to agencies 
doing regulatory analysis as well as to 
reduce the discretion they often take in 
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Figure 1 
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going beyond the role envisioned by Con-
gress. Each congressional committee ought 
to be required to present estimates of the 
likely benefits and costs of regulatory ac-
tions necessary to implement proposed leg-
islation. To improve the credibility of these 
estimates, Congress should establish an 
independent Congressional Office of Regu-
latory Analysis staffed with experienced 
apolitical analysts willing to let the chips 
fall where they may. 
1980: A Watershed Year 
In many regards, 1980 was a turning 
point in government regulation. That year 
the regulatory workforce of the federal gov-
ernment reached a new high. The total of 
121,791 employees represented a steep 
average annual rise of 5.8 percent from 
1970 (see Figure 1). The next several years 
witnessed the sharpest decline in the 
employment of the federal regulatory agen-
cies, at least in modern times. (Figure 2 
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Figure 2 
Spending on Federal Regulatory Activity, 
1960-2000 
(Fiscal Years, in Billions of 
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shows a similar trend in another widely 
used measure of regulatory activity, fed-
eral outlays for regulation.) 
Substantive policy changes, in the 
main, tended to follow a comparable tra-
jectory. In the 1970s, Congress enacted a 
plethora of new or expanded regulatory 
programs covering consumer product 
safety, antitrust, toxic substances, over-
seas bribery, energy, strip mining, mini-
mum wages, debt collection, age discrimi-
nation, water pollution, noise pollution, 
speed limits, campaign finance, product 
warranties, employee pensions, drinking 
water, hazardous materials, air pollution, 
job safety, and credit cards. 
In the latter part of the decade, the 
stirrings of regulatory reform began to be 
visible. Congress passed a landmark air-
line deregulation bill in 1978. In the area 
of procedure, President Jimmy Carter 
expanded the process of reviewing pro-
posed regulations launched earlier in the 
decade by President Gerald Ford. 
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The year 1980 was a period of transi-
tion. On the positive side, Congress elimi-
nated much of the detailed apparatus of 
railroad and trucking regulation. In addi-
tion, the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the 
Paperwork Reduction Act were enacted. 
Because it enjoys substantial 
bipartisan support, centralized 
regulatory review can be expected 
to stay regardless of the outcome 
of the elections in 2000. 
The regulatory flexibility statute was 
perfunctory. Although it nominally re-
quired rulemaking agencies to write regu-
lations in a manner that would minimize 
the burdens on small business, actual 
compliance has been minimal. The paper-
work law, which took effect in 1981, turned 
out to be a sleeper. It established the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Mfairs 
(OIRA), the part of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget that carries out the cen-
tralized regulatory reviews mandated by 
President Reagan and continued by his 
successors.' Because it enjoys substantial 
bipartisan support, centralized regulatory 
review can be expected to stay regardless 
of the outcome of the elections in 2000. 
Not all change on the regulatory front 
in 1980 represented progress. That year, 
Congress also created Superfund, a monu-
ment to the encouragement of costly liti-
gation as a deterrent to environmental 
cleanup. The partial banking deregulation 
law enacted in 1980 produced a mixed bag 
of results. Phasing out interest rate ceil-
ings was a direct move to a more competi-
tive financial system. However, the change 
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also contributed to the subsequent finan-
cial collapse of the savings and loan asso-
ciations (S&Ls). 
In late 1980, presidential candidate 
Ronald Reagan promised to rein in the 
expansion of regulation, especially by re-
quiring detailed cost-benefit analyses for 
all new regulations. 2 
Expectations and Reality 
At the beginning of the 1980s, propo-
nents of regulatory reform were enthusi-
astic. Mter years of massive expansions of 
the federal regulatory apparatus, at long 
last the tide would turn. Events in early 
1981 surely seemed to confirm that expec-
tation. Newly-elected President Reagan 
quickly eliminated energy price and allo-
cation controls and the vestige of "volun-
tary" wage and price controls of the past. 
In the February 18, 1981 message outlin-
ing his supply-side economic program, 
President Reagan listed regulatory reform 
as one of the four key components. Fulfill-
ing his campaign pledge , he issued a key 
executive order requiring federal agencies 
to demonstrate that the benefits of pro-
posed new r egulations exceeded their 
costs. President Reagan also charged OIRA 
with the responsibility to enforce this re-
quirement. At the same time, he estab-
lished a high -level Regulatory Relief Task 
Force chaired by the vice president to over-
see the entire regulatory reform effort. 
In many ways, results were very heart-
ening. As noted earlier, the size of the fed-
eral regulatory establishment was curtailed 
for several years. Further, the regulatory 
review process instituted by President 
Reagan had a substantial impact. Although 
only a small proportion of the thousands 
of regulations reviewed by OMB was re-
turned or withdrawn, the threat of such 
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severe action often motivated substantial 
changes, including deferring some regula-
tory initiatives. 
Several deregulatory statutes were en-
acted, such as the Bus Regulatory Reform 
Act of 1982 and the Shipping Act of 1984. 
The most significant accomplishment was 
so undramatic that it went unnoticed: dur-
ing the Reagan presidency-and unlike 
other administrations in recent decades-
no new regulatory agency was established 
nor was any major regulatory program sub-
stantially expanded. It was reminiscent of 
the Sherlock Holmes tale where the most 
significant clue was not action at all, but 
the fact that the dog did not bark. 
The most significant accomplish-
ment of the 1980s was so 
undramatic that it went unnoticed: 
during the Reagan presidency 
no new regulatory agency was 
established nor was any major 
regulatory program substantially 
expanded. 
The best available evidence on overall 
regulatory cost is illustrated in Figure 3, 
indicating that the aggregate burden of 
regulation declined substantially in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. This reduction is 
attributable to significant economic de-
regulation of airlines, surface transporta-
tion, telecommunications, and financial 
services. In the mid-1980s, this wave of 
economic deregulation ended and the pace 
of environmental regulation intensified. 
Aggregate regulatory costs resumed their 
upward climb. 
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Figure 3 
Annualized Regulatory Costs, 1977-2000 
(1995 dollars, in billions) 
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In the early 1980s, forecasts of regula-
tory doom and gloom were prevalent. The 
critics thought that the green eye-shade 
people in the Reagan administration were 
so determined to grant business "regula-
tory relief' that they were oblivious to the 
great damage that would be done to the 
environment, workers' health, and other 
vital social goals. 
These dire forecasts did not come to 
pass. By every important standard, the 
environment is cleaner, the workplace is 
safer, and substantial progress has been 
made toward achieving the other goals at 
which social regulations are aimed. The 
major measures of workplace accidents 
maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics are down significantly from 1979. Al-
most all of the pollutants for which the 
Environmental Protection Agency has set 
national standards show substantial de-
clines in emissions from 1982. More ofthe 
nation's rivers and lakes are now "fishable 
and swimmable." Most fundamentally, the 
average life span of Americans continues 
to lengthen. 
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Moreover, the economic deregulation 
that started in the late 1970s and acceler-
ated in the 1980s has injected competi-
tion into the market economy with strongly 
positive results. Costs and prices in the 
deregulated industries have come down 
while the pace of innovation has acceler-
ated. The industries that have been or are 
being gradually deregulated include air-
lines, railroads, trucking, fmancial services, 
telecommunications, and utilities. These 
results have had a profound and pervasive 
influence in bringing down inflation, ex-
tending economic growth, and raising liv-
ing standards.3 
However, progress on regulatory re-
form has not followed a straight line. The 
restraint on enacting new or expanded 
regulatory legislation weakened in the 
mid-1980s. In 1986, Congress passed a 
statute requiring removal of materials con-
taining asbestos from school buildings. 
(Horror stories quickly accumulated about 
the illnesses caused by the resultant 
movement into the air of hitherto dormant 
asbestos products.) This was quickly fol-
lowed by expansions of the statutes cov-
ering hazardous waste sites, age discrimi-
nation, and single employer pension plans. 
In the late 1980s, Congress passed a 
number of new regulatory statutes, among 
them laws requiring advance notice of lay-
offs of 50 or more workers, a reauthoriza-
tion of the nation's pesticide law, and mas-
sive new restrictions on S&Ls. Legislation 
in the early 1990s included a huge expan-
sion of EPA's authority to regulate air pol-
lution, a new and draconian law goveming 
oil tanker design, a new civil rights law, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, and expan-
sion of the enforcement powers of the SEC. 
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 
gave employees a legal entitlement to take 
extended leave while retainingjob reinstate-
8 
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ment rights. In few cases were the benefits 
and costs of these new laws independently 
estimated prior to enactment. No system-
atic evaluation has been conducted since. 
Progress on regulatory refonn 
has not followed a straight line. 
The restraint on enacting new or 
expanded regulatory legislation 
weakened in the mid-1980s. 
A variety of laws passed in the middle 
and late 1990s continued the renewed 
upward trend in regulatory enactments. 
Examples include the Lobbying Disclosure 
Act of 1995, the Food Quality Protection 
Act of 1996, the Health Insurance Portabil-
ity and Accountability Act of 1996, and the 
National Securities Markets Improvement 
Act of 1996.4 The federal regulatory agen-
cies, especially EPA, responded with alac-
rity in generating another burst of rule-
making initiatives. These ranged from a 
new "environmental justice" program to 
toughened air quality standards (the former 
lacked specific statutory justification while 
the latter was devoid of adequate scientific 
support). 
Simultaneously, Congress has taken a 
few important steps toward reducing the 
burdens of government regulation. The 
Interstate Banking and Branching Effi-
ciency Act of 1994 permitted banks to set 
up more interstate branches. In 1999, Con-
gress voted to eliminate the wall separat-
ing banks and other financial institutions 
that had been set up by the Glass-Steagall 
Act of the 1930s. The Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 was intended to open up com-
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petition for local telephone service. How-
ever, progress has been delayed, mainly by 
the attempt of the Federal Communications 
Commission to closely regulate the process 
of deregulation. Also in 1996, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission was abolished, but 
its residual functions were transferred to 
the new Surface Transportation Board. 
The regulatory reform effort 
initiated in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s has run out of 
steam. What is needed is not a 
renewal of the earlier effort, but 
a shift in the basic thrust of 
regulatory reform. 
In 1993, the Clinton Administration 
rescinded the existing executive orders on 
regulatory review and replaced them with 
a new one that reaffirmed OMB (via OIRA) 
as the central agency charged with review-
ing proposed regulations. On the surface, 
the new executive order requires the regu-
latory agencies to do many sensible things 
in the process of drafting rules, including 
considering benefits and costs and identi-
fying market-based alternatives for meet-
ing governmental objectives. 
In reviewing the actions under the 
Clinton executive order, however, the Gen-
eral Accounting Office reported discourag-
ing results in terms of substantive compli-
ance. Experienced reviewers of federal 
regulations note that the agencies are not 
likely to comply seriously on a voluntary 
basis and will only respond to stringent 
judicial oversight and informed public pres-
sure. 5 As an indicator of the shortcomings 
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of the current regulatory review process, 
as of October 1998 the Competitive Enter-
prise Institute identified over 100 new 
rules, each of which was estimated by fed-
eral agencies to cost over $100 million a 
year. That is a costly pipeline of future 
regulation. 6 
Meanwhile, efforts to get Congress to 
pass a generic or comprehensive regula-
tory reform law continue. Under the Un-
funded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, fed-
eral agencies are required to assess the 
benefits and costs of new regulations that 
impact significantly on state and local gov-
ernments. Although the new law did not 
outlaw these mandates, it may have slowed 
down the creation of new ones. The same 
year, however, the proposed Comprehen-
sive Regulatory Reform Act, which had 
passed the House of Representatives, failed 
in the Senate by one vote. The next year 
Congress did enact the Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, 
which established a procedure for congres-
sional review of major rules. So far, not a 
single regulation has been overturned using 
these new procedures. 
The Need for Further 
Regulatory Reform 
The regulatory reform effort initiated in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s has run out 
of steam. What is needed is not a renewal 
of the earlier effort, but a shift in the basic 
thrust of regulatory reform. Virtually all 
proposals to date have focused on improv-
ing the way in which government agencies 
write regulations to carry out laws already 
enacted. Although this activity is useful, it 
ignores the compelling fact that the key 
decisions occur earlier in the process-when 
Congress passes an Occupational Safety 
and Health Act or an amendment to the 
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Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act or any other 
important regulatory law, usually with hun-
dreds of pages of detailed specifications. 1 
Each congressional committee should 
be required, when drafting a regulatory 
statute, to present estimates of the ex-
pected benefits and costs of the regulatory 
program in the report accompanying the 
legislation. The committee should affirm 
that these benefits justify the program in 
light of its estimated costs. Such a state-
ment, and the benefit-cost analysis sup-
porting it, should be required before a leg-
islative proposal can be reported to the full 
House or Senate. 
In contrast, the way many regulatory 
statutes are now written both requires the 
agencies to ignore economic effects and 
precludes them from even considering the 
most cost-effective approaches. Key provi-
sions of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act, the Food, Drug, and Cosmet-
ics Act, the Clean Air Act, the Safe Drink-
ing Water Act, and the Superfund Act have 
been interpreted by the courts to prohibit 
the regulators from taking account of eco-
nomic impacts when setting standards. 
Despite well-intended presidential direc-
tives, it is impossible for regulators to strike 
any sensible balance between the costs 
they impose and the benefits they gener-
ate when the basic regulatory laws prohibit 
costs from being considered at all. 
Congress should eliminate provisions 
in existing regulatory statutes that prevent 
or limit regulatory agencies from consid-
ering costs or comparing expected benefits 
with costs when designing and promulgat-
ing regulations. Regulations that seek to 
reduce health or safety risks should be 
based on scientific risk-assessment and 
should address risks that are real and sig-
nificant rather than hypothetical or remote. 
Confidence in benefit-cost analysis ofregu-
12 
lations would be enhanced by use of a com-
mon set of assumptions and the require-
ment for peer review of the analyses. More-
over, major benefit-cost analyses should 
undergo retrospective reviews and up-
dates.8 
Congress should eliminate 
provisions in existing regulatory 
statutes that prevent or limit 
regulatory agencies from consid-
ering costs or comparing 
expected benefits with costs 
when designing and promulgating 
regulations. 
More fundamentally, all those involved 
in the government's decision-making pro-
cess should realize that identifying a worthy 
objective does not necessarily create a need 
for regulation. Government is already a very 
substantial presence in the American 
economy. Today's large federal establish-
ment has great difficulty carrying out the 
numerous responsibilities already assigned 
to it. In contrast, the ability of competitive 
markets to protect the public is very power-
ful and not fully appreciated. The burden 
should be on those who would replace the 
market with additional regulation to dem-
onstrate with solid information and care-
ful analysis that the public would benefit 
from a further extension of government into 
the private sector. 
Small businesses are especially vulner-
able to arbitrary actions by regulators. The 
Wisconsin toy producer who went out of 
business following an erroneous report by 
the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
is a classic example of a little firm unable 
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to cope with large bureaucracy. The agency 
refused to correct its error in a timely fash-
ion even after acknowledging the mistake-
and the company lost much of its sales as 
a result. 
A key barrier to reforming 
regulation is the common and 
erroneous perception that the 
costs of government regulation 
are of little concern to citizens 
because they are simply paid by 
business. 
Often officials lack the authority to cor-
rect an error quickly, even when they want 
to do so. For example, the EPA admitted it 
erred in listing the household antibiotic 
Bacitracin as an "extremely hazardous" 
substance. However, the agency was pre-
cluded from deleting that erroneous list-
ing without going through the same bur-
densome process that it does in newly list-
ing a very hazardous product. 9 
A key barrier to reforming regulation is 
the common and erroneous perception that 
the costs of govemment regulation are of 
little concern to citizens because they are 
simply paid by business. That is not so. 
By and large, those costs are ultimately 
bome by the workers and consumers who 
make and purchase products and services 
produced under regulation. Moreover, 
much of the rule making extends to all 
employers, be they profit or nonprofit, in 
the public sector or in the private sector. 
The American people deserve better 
results from the substantial resources de-
voted to regulation. Too many of these 
14 
regulations have been grossly inefficient, 
causing us to waste scarce resources in 
the pursuit of trivial or imaginary improve-
ments in human health protection and 
environmental quality. Gains in these ar-
eas may be possible, but we will obtain 
them only by chance if we continue present 
practices. If we are truly serious about 
achieving cleaner air and water, safer work-
places and residences, and better living 
standards, especially for the poor, then a 
vibrant and relentless program of indepen-
dent regulatory analysis and oversight will 
be necessary along with institutional 
changes that discourage old, discredited 
ways of legislating and regulating. The re-
forms proposed in this report are not 
merely matters of procedure and economic 
accounting. By enhancing the accountabil-
ity of our legislators and regulators, they 
would improve the lives of the American 
people. 
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